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MATTHEWS v. FULLER
negligence alone, make no mention of the misdemeanor-
manslaughter rule, a few cases have expressly refused to
apply the rule in manslaughter by automobile cases.31
Negligence itself is an indefinite concept, and when an
attempt is made to define degrees of negligence, the prob-
lem becomes more difficult. Perhaps the adoption of the
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule by Maryland, which would
make the defendant who engages in an unlawful act, which
is the proximate cause of death, guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter, would make the law more definite. Under this
rule, the presence or degree of negligence is unimportant.
In many cases, it would have the effect of making prosecu-
tions for manslaughter easier, and this may be desirable
in view of the number of deaths caused by automobiles.
The use of such a rule would, of course, entail a judgment
that violation of a traffic safety law is sufficiently serious
to justify conviction of manslaughter.
Jo-w C. ELDRMIGE
Effect Of Subsequently Probated Will Upon
Bona Fide Purchaser From The Heirs
Matthews v. Fuller'
On June 20, 1944 the Orphans' Court for Charles County
passed an order declaring that Amelia Roy had died in-
testate. Letters of administration were granted to her
sister after she had stated that no will of decedent had
been found, although a diligent search had been made.
Amelia had died seized of certain land, which her heirs at
law sold to the defendant (a bona fide purchaser) after entry
of the Orphans' Court order declaring Amelia's intestacy.
Eight years later, a will purporting to be that of Amelia
Roy, dated 1936, was found in the files of a deceased at-
torney, and filed for probate. This paper, which was ad-
mitted to probate on September 2, 1952, gave the land to
a nephew, and not to the persons who took as heirs at law.
81 See State v. McLean, 234 N. C. 283, 67 S. E. 2d 75 (1951). See also
State v. Neril, 10 N. J. Super. 224, 76 A. 2d 915, 917 (1950), where the Court
holds that although violations of the Motor Vehicle Law are elements to
take into consideration in determining whether there is willful or wanton
disregard of rights or safety of others, ". . . mere violations of regulatory
statutes are not sufficient to make a person criminally liable for death".
2209 Md. 42, 12D A. 2d 356 (1956).
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The nephew brought ejectment against the defendant.2
At the trial, it was agreed that neither of the parties in-
volved had any knowledge of the existence of the will prior
to its discovery in 1952. The lower court protected the
bona fide purchaser of the land against the devisees under
the will. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, noting
that "[t] his case falls in a blank spot in the testamentary
statute law of this State and is one of first impression in
this Court."'
There are surprisingly few cases in the United States
that have involved the above problem. Of the few cases
that have been adjudicated, there seems to be an almost
even split in authority as to whether the bona fide pur-
chaser should be protected.4 Some of these cases have
afforded the bona fide purchaser protection on such grounds
as laches, fraud, or special statutes.' Maryland, however,
has no statute of limitations fixing the time within which
a will must be offered for probate;6 the defense of fraud
was not present, as neither party had notice of the exis-
tence of a will; nor does Maryland have any controlling
special statutes. Conceding that ".... the title of a devisee
to real estate generally relates back, upon probate of the
will, to the date of death of the testator",7 the Court held
that the heirs, who did not have the legal title, had effec-
tively sold and conveyed the interests of the devisee.
Despite this apparent incongruity it is submitted that the
Court of Appeal's ruling was a good practical solution to
an unusual problem. The key to the problem exists in the
fact that the estate was "administered as an intestate es-
tate", and such administration was "relied upon" by the
purchaser.8
In the case of realty the primary purpose of having an
estate administered is to give creditors of the deceased
ample opportunity to have their claims heard, and thus
clear the estate of its liabilities.9 After the claims have
2 The nephew had waited until limitations had run on the time for filing
a caveat, and then instituted the ejectment suit, ibid 47.
1 Supra, n. 1, 47.
'22 A. L. R. 2d 1107, 1109, listing cases favoring the devisee from
Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, and North Carolina. Cases contra,
protecting the bona fide purchaser are listed from Arkansas, Georgia,
Illinois, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
IDodd v. Holden, 205 Ark. 817, 171 S. W. 2d 948 (1943); Hayes v.
Simmons, 136 Okla. 206, 277 P. 213 (1928) ; Hadden v. Stevens, 181 Ga. 165,
181 S. E. 767 (1935).
6 Sewell v. Slingluff, 57 Md. 537, 555 (1882).
Matthews v. Fuller, 209 Md. 42, 50, 120 A. 2d 356 (1956).
'Supra, n. 4, 1115, et 8eq. for cases emphasizing this point.
18 Md. Code (1957), Art. 93, §§109, 110, 111.
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been presented, and the court has reached its conclusions
and issued its final decree clearing the estate of its indebted-
ness, the record of the proceeding is made public notice
to everyone, and all persons are bound to know the facts
it discloses. Thus, if everyone is afforded an opportunity
to know the record of the estate, and is charged by law to
know the same, the purchaser from the heirs should be
justified in assuming that the deceased died intestate and
that the heirs had power to convey a good legal title. °
Possibly, the adoption of this rule appears harsh to the
innocent devisee under the will, who knew nothing of its
existence until after the sale of the land by the heirs at
law. However, if such a rule is not adopted, a bona fide
purchaser of land from the heirs of a deceased person could
not be certain that he has an indefeasible title to the land,
as a will might later be found. This is especially true in
Maryland, where there is no statute of limitations on the
probate of a will.' Only after twenty years of adverse
possession would the danger of the probate of a lost will
be removed. The Wisconsin court stated this very aptly:
"To hold that a bona fide purchaser [of intestate
property] under the circumstances in this case cannot
rely upon an adjudication of intestacy or upon a final
decree would have a tendency for an unlimited time,
in effect, to suspend the power of alienation.' 12
If the policy of protecting the bona fide purchaser as
against the devisee is the one to be followed, is this not in
effect denying the effectiveness of the probate? The im-
mediate answer to this question should be no. The will
can and should be probated at the earliest opportunity, 8
and the relation back doctrine should be applied to all
devises and bequests not involving rights of intervening
bona fide purchasers. It should be remembered that the
judicial finding of intestacy is not a bar to the probate of
a lost will. But a court should not enforce the relation
back doctrine if the application of this doctrine is inequi-
table. 14
10 Van Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 608, 18 A. 892 (1889) ; Simpson v. Cornish,
196 Wis. 125, 218 N. W. 193 (1928).
Sewell v. Slingluff, 57 Md. 537, 555 (1882).
Simpson v. Cornish, supra, n. 10, 204.23Pilert v. Pielert, 202 Md. 406, 96 A. 2d 498 (1953). 8 Md. Code (1957),
Art. 93, §373; 3 Md. Code (1957), Art. 27, §127.
1 StelJes v. Simmons, 170 N. C. 42, 86 N. E. 801 (1915) ; 48 A. L. R. 1035;
Jones v. Nichols, 280 Mo. 653, 216 S. W. 962 (1919).
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The additional question arises whether a bona fide pur-
chaser should similarly be protected in the situation in
which there has been no administration of the intestate
estate. There is no question that heirs have the power to
sell land, according to the common law doctrine that real
property descends directly to them upon the death of the
intestate.15 No administration is needed, although such a
proceeding is most desirable in order to clear the property
of the decedent's debts.'6 Even though the heirs have the
power to sell the land, the good faith purchaser in this type
of case should not be protected, since he did not act in
reliance on a judicial finding that the deceased died in-
testate and therefore took only the interest the heirs had to
sell.17 The heirs' interest did not rest upon a judicial deter-
mination either that the land was free from debt or that
the decedent died intestate. The only interest the heirs
could convey by sale was a defeasible estate.'8 If a sub-
sequently discovered will is probated the heirs are divested
of this estate, which in turn divests the good faith vendee.19
The vendee relied on no court order or decree2 and as-
sumed the risk that a will might later be found. As there
was no administration, the buyer relied not on a judicial
finding but on the representations of the heirs that they had
power to sell, and the doctrine of caveat emptor should
apply.21
OFor an excellent history of title by descent see: 3 WAsH-aBU, REA.L
PROPERTY, 5 (1887).
mSupra, n. 9.
' As far back as 1855, in Far. & Plan. Bank v. Martin, 7 Md. 342 (1855),
it was held that in Chancery sales, the only thing sold was the interest
of the parties to the proceeding, and the doctrine of caveat emptor applied.
IsIbid, 345. See also Brown v. Wallace, 2 Bland 585 (Md. 1830).
1Reid's Adm'r. v. Benge, 112 Ky. 810, 66 S. W. 997 (1902), held that
where an heir took the property, and seven years later a will was found,
the devisee under the will had a vested interest, and to divest that interest
there must be either a conveyance, prescription, or estoppel In some form.
0 Van Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 609, 614, 18 A. 892 (1889) :
"We hold, therefore, when the records of the Orphans' Court, made
In conformity with the law, show a final settlement of the personal
estate, and when the settlement indicates that all proved debts and
the costs of administration have been paid in full, and that there is
still a balance in the hands of the executor or administrator, a pur-
chaser is justified in assuming, if he have not actual knowledge to the
contrary, that all debts have been paid and that the land Is exonerated
from its conditional liability. Should he, under these circumstances,
purchase, in good faith and for value, from the heir or devisee, he will
be protected as a bona fide purchaser, in the strictest sense of the
term, even though debts amounting to more than the personal estate
should afterwards be discovered."
For partition cases where the court has sold only the title the parties
have, see Scarlett v. Robinson, 112 Md. 202, 76 A. 181 (1910) ; Slowthower
v. Gordon, 23 Md. 1 (1865) ; Supra, n. 17.
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In the discussion above, two basic problems have been
considered. The first is the situation where the heirs at law
sell to a bona fide purchaser after a judicial finding of in-
testacy but prior to the discovery of a will. In this case
the good faith purchaser should be protected because of
his reliance on the court's ruling of intestacy.22 The second
situation arises where the heirs at law sell to a good faith
purchaser, there having been no administration of the
estate prior to the discovery of a will. Here, it was con-
ceded that the bona fide purchaser should not be protected,
as there was no reliance upon a judicial finding. With these
two situations in mind, one might speculate as to the solu-
tion in a case where the heirs themselves, after having
administered the estate and entered into possession, are
faced with the discovery cf a lost or innocently misplaced
will. The courts in such a case, where there is no innocent
third party involved, should not protect the heirs at law
whether the estate has been administered or not. Although
it might seem that this answer departs from a policy of
protecting persons who rely on a judicial finding of in-
testacy, the reasoning behind the answer is not inconsis-
tent with this basic premise. It cannot be said the heirs
at law relied upon the court's order. They took as a matter
of right and not on the faith of a judicial finding. The ele-
ment of reliance is missing, and thus protection from a sub-
sequently found will need not be afforded the heirs at law,
who have not conveyed to a bona fide purchaser.
The result reached in the instant case makes the admin-
istration of an estate the pivot upon which a good faith
purchaser, buying land from the heirs after an adjudication
of intestacy, can place his confidence. Thus administration
of the estate of an intestate is important for two reasons:
(1) Land will be conclusively cleared of liability for in-
testate's debts.
(2) A bona fide purchaser for value from the heirs will
be protected against a subsequently discovered will.
Unless administration is made the conclusive act upon
which the purchaser in good faith can rely alienation of
intestate property may be hampered for at least twenty
years.2"
SAUL J. McGRANE
Supra, n. 20; Matthews v. Fuller, 209 Md. 42, 120 A. 2d 356 (1956).
28 Simpson v. Cornish, 196 Wis. 125, 218 N. W. 193, 204 (1928).
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